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VOLCANO
Index

Understanding innovation · Part II · From laboratory to market

07 · Risk and its management

12 min de lectura

In brief

  1. The risk of an innovation project is not an indistinct fog: it breaks down into components (technological, market, execution, ecosystem) that are measured and reduced with different instruments. The first act of management is to name the dominant risk.
  2. The two great methods of the discipline, phased processes with decision gates (stage-gate) and hypothesis validation (customer development, lean startup), are not alternatives: the first structures when decisions are taken, the second what counts as evidence for deciding.
  3. The common principle is conditional incremental investment: buy information at the lowest possible cost, and commit increasing capital only against demonstrated decreasing risk.
  4. The most frequent documented failure is not technology that does not work but premature scaling: spending to grow before retention and unit economics support it.
  5. Analysis has a cost too: there is a decision window beyond which continuing to gather information costs more than it is worth. Knowing how to decide with incomplete information is part of the method, not a violation of it.

Section 1

Anatomy of risk

"Risky" is a useless adjective until you specify which risk. The operational breakdown distinguishes four components, each with its own question and its own instruments of reduction.

Technological risk: does the mechanism work? In real conditions, at the foreseen costs, reproducibly? It is reduced with the progression of evidence of chapter 06: proof of concept, validation in the laboratory, demonstration in a relevant environment.

Market risk: does anyone want it, enough to pay for it, in sufficient numbers, reachable at sustainable costs? It is reduced with the validation of the problem (chapter 02) and with the demand experiments that this chapter deals with; chapter 05 showed that it includes the risk of adoption and of timing.

Execution risk: does the organisation know how to do what the plan requires, in the time and at the cost foreseen? It includes team, production (the MRL axis), operations, and the availability of the necessary competencies; chapter 13 will deal with the organisational side, and the law of the minimum of chapter 16 is its synthesis: the project yields according to the competency that is missing.

Ecosystem risk: does success depend on actors outside the project's control? Ron Adner (The Wide Lens, 2012) has shown that many failures attributed to the product are in reality failures of co-innovation (the necessary complements were not ready: the case of 3D televisions without 3D content) or of downstream adoption (an intermediary in the chain had no incentive to adopt). The diagnostic question: for the value promised to the end customer, who else has to innovate or adopt, and why would they do so within our timescale?

The breakdown produces the rule of sequence that governs the whole chapter: work first on the largest residual risk, because that is where a euro of validation buys the most information. A project that perfects the technology while the dominant risk is market risk is buying the wrong information, however well it buys it.

Section 2

Stage-gate: structuring decisions

The phased process with decision gates, codified by Robert Cooper (1990) from the observation of the practices of firms with the best success rates in product development, organises the path into stages of work separated by gates: points of formal decision at which the project continues, is stopped, or goes back, on the basis of explicit criteria and verifiable deliverables.

The features that make the method work, and that are lost in bureaucratic implementations, are three. The criteria of the gates are fixed beforehand, not negotiated in front of the project: this is the procedural antidote to the biases of chapter 03. Whoever decides at the gate is not whoever proposes: the separation of roles takes the vote away from sunk costs. And stopping is a foreseen and honoured outcome of the process, not an accident: a healthy funnel narrows, and the portfolio (chapter 08) lives off the projects stopped early as much as off those carried forward.

The documented criticism of the model concerns contexts of high uncertainty: if the gates ask for detailed plans and financial projections from projects that have not yet validated the problem, they produce analytical fiction (numbers invented in order to pass the gate) and rigidity. The hybrid versions (agile-stage-gate, Cooper and Sommer, 2016) correct this by asking the gates not for plans but for evidence: which leads directly to the second method.

Section 3

Hypothesis validation: what counts as evidence

The strand of customer development (Steve Blank, The Four Steps to the Epiphany, 2005) and of lean startup (Eric Ries, 2011) starts from a diagnosis: in the conditions of a new company, the plan is a set of unverified hypotheses, and treating it as a plan to be executed is the founding error. The method that follows treats every element of the model (the problem exists, this segment feels it, it would pay this price, this channel reaches it) as a hypothesis to be verified with the least expenditure, in the build-measure-learn cycle.

The key instruments, in their correct use. The minimum viable product is not a shoddy product: it is the smallest experiment capable of verifying the riskiest hypothesis, and it does not need to be sellable (the ladder of product versions, from MVP to MMP, is in chapter 06); it may be a page that measures conversion, a series of structured interviews, a service delivered by hand behind a product facade (the "concierge"), even before it is a prototype. Validated learning distinguishes evidence from vanity metrics: what counts is behaviour that costs those who perform it something (time committed, data provided, money paid, contracts signed), not applause; the hierarchy of evidence of chapter 02, from the stated to the contractual, is the same. The pivot is the structured change of one component of the model that preserves the accumulated learning: the technology that changes market, the product that becomes a component, the channel that changes; it is the rational outcome of a refuted hypothesis, distinct both from obstinacy and from abandonment.

The practical breakdown that connects this method to section 1 distinguishes three families of hypotheses: desirability (do they want it?), feasibility (do we know how to build it?), economic sustainability (does the model hold: margins, acquisition costs, recurrence?). The sequence of experiments follows the largest residual risk, and the operational literature (Bland and Osterwalder, Testing Business Ideas, 2019) catalogues for each family the available experiments with their cost and the strength of the evidence they produce.

The two methods combine without friction once their respective roles are clarified: hypothesis validation defines what counts as evidence and how to produce it at low cost; stage-gate defines when the evidence is examined, by whom, and with what consequences for capital. A mature process is a funnel of experiments with decision gates: the phases produce validated learning, the gates convert it into investment decisions.

Section 4

The typical failure: premature scaling

If a single error had to be chosen for teaching, the evidence indicates which one. The Startup Genome Report (Marmer et al., 2011-2012), on a sample of thousands of startups, identified premature scaling as the most widespread cause of death: spending to grow (hiring, marketing, structure, internationalisation) before the foundations support it, that is, before retention demonstrates that the product retains customers and unit economics demonstrates that each additional customer creates value instead of destroying it.

The mechanism is insidious because premature scaling produces, for a period, all the outward signals of success: growing revenue, an expanding team, rising volume metrics. Growth bought with acquisition at negative margins is, however, a multiplier of the underlying problem: every customer added increases the loss, and when the capital that financed the illusion runs out, the fall is all the more ruinous the more the structure had expanded. The Webvan case remains the canonical illustration: home delivery of groceries, flotation in 1999, a plan to expand to dozens of cities with automated warehouses costing tens of millions of dollars each, built before unit economics had been demonstrated in a single city; more than 800 million dollars consumed, bankruptcy in 2001. The ordering question, banal to state and systematically evaded under competitive pressure ("we have to occupy the market before the others"), is: what demonstrates that multiplying this machine multiplies value and not losses? The answer lives in two numbers, cohort retention and unit margin including acquisition costs, and until those numbers hold at small scale, scale is an accelerator of failure.

Section 5

The decision window: when to stop analysing

The chapter has insisted on buying information before committing capital; this last section fixes the limit of the principle, because information too has a price and protracted analysis is itself a decision (to delay) with its own costs.

The conceptual frame comes from decision theory: additional information is worth as much as its expected capacity to change the decision. If every plausible scenario of further investigation leads to the same choice, the investigation has zero value and its cost is a dead loss. To the direct costs of analysis are added the costs of delay: the time windows of chapter 05 close, competitors move, the best team does not wait. And the accumulation of analysis beyond the useful threshold is not neutral cognitively either: it feeds the feeling of control more than the quality of the choice, and becomes a socially acceptable form of postponement.

A window follows: before it, deciding is rash (the missing information would plausibly change the choice, and it costs little to obtain); after it, deciding is a duty (the residual information is costly, slow, or incapable of changing the choice). The discipline consists in declaring in advance which evidence would decide (which is then the structure of the gates of section 2: criteria first, examination afterwards) and in recognising that the residual risk at the moment of decision is not a defect of the method but its object: risk management does not promise certainty, it promises that the capital committed is proportionate to the available evidence, and that the evidence has been bought at the best price.

In the Volcano method

This chapter is the theory of the seven decisions of the path: the questions that close the phases from F1 to F7 are gates in the sense of section 2, with criteria declared beforehand (the question of each phase is public), evidence required in order to close, and stopping honoured as an outcome ("matar pronto y barato lo que no merece seguir"). The families of risk in section 1 each have their own safeguard: technological risk in the TRL progression of macro-phase 1, market risk in the validation of the problem (F1-F2) and in the metrics of macro-phase 2, execution risk in the core of competencies (with the declared selection criterion: if a discipline is missing that we do not know how to obtain, the project is not opened), and the F4-F5 sequence (concept verified on paper before real instruments) applies the principle of buying information at minimum cost. The F8/F9 boundary is explicitly declared to be the vaccination against premature scaling, with reference to the Startup Genome: growth does not buy loss-making revenue, and the unit metrics have to hold before multiplying. The four risk questions are the public protocol with which the method decides on stops, and the decision window of section 5 is dealt with at length in the essay "Cuánta información basta": one hundred per cent of the information never arrives, and there is an interval in which enough is known to decide.

Readings

Further reading

  • R.G. Cooper, "Stage-Gate Systems: A New Tool for Managing New Products" (Business Horizons, 1990): the original formulation of the method; for the hybridisation with agile, Cooper and Sommer (2016).
  • E. Ries, The Lean Startup (2011): the build-measure-learn cycle, MVP, validated learning, pivot; to be read together with S. Blank, The Four Steps to the Epiphany (2005), which is its foundation.
  • D.J. Bland and A. Osterwalder, Testing Business Ideas (2019): the operational catalogue of validation experiments, classified by cost and strength of the evidence.
  • R. Adner, The Wide Lens (2012): ecosystem risk, with the cases of missing co-innovation and downstream adoption.

Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

Are stage-gate and lean startup not opposing philosophies?

Only in caricature. Stage-gate structures when decisions are taken and with which criteria; hypothesis validation defines what counts as evidence and how to produce it at low cost. The historical defect of stage-gate (asking for plans and projections from those who have not yet validated the problem) is corrected exactly by putting validated learning in place of plans as the currency of the gates: this is what the current hybrid versions do, and it is the most solid configuration for projects with high uncertainty.

Is the pivot a disguised failure?

No: it is the rational response to a refuted hypothesis, and it preserves the learning already paid for (about the customer, the technology, the channel) by reorienting it. The warning signal is not the pivot but its pathology: serial pivots in which no hypothesis is ever verified thoroughly indicate a process that does not produce evidence, and obstinacy and abandonment remain the two symmetrical errors between which the pivot is the disciplined middle way.

If the prototype works, is the bulk of the risk behind us?

No: it has changed axis. A demonstrated prototype closes part of the technological risk and leaves market, execution and ecosystem risk intact, and these statistically kill more projects than the technical side does. This is the reason for the double thermometer of chapter 06 and for the F8/F9 boundary: once the technical proof is passed, the questions become retention, unit economics and channel, and they have to be passed with the same discipline of evidence, not taken as implicit.

How much analysis is needed before an investment decision?

That, and only that, which is capable of changing the decision. The operational criterion: declare beforehand which evidence would lead to a different choice, estimate its cost and the time needed to acquire it, and compare these with the cost of delay (windows closing, competitors, alternative opportunities). If no evidence obtainable at a reasonable cost would change the choice, the decision window is open and postponement is only risk disguised as prudence.

We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard.
John F. Kennedy, 1962
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